

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 197433

NODIS
FOR DR BRZEZINSKI ONLY

FOLLOWING REPEAT USUN 2660 ACTION STATE INFO GABORONE DAR ES SALAAM
LONDON LAGOS LUSAKA MAPUTO PRETORIA TEHRAN AUG 19.

QUOTE C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 2660

NODIS

LONDON PLS PASS TO AMBASSADOR MCHENRY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, XJ, RH
SUBJ: UK/US PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES DISCUSS THE NEXT
STEPS IN RHODESIA

1. SUMMARY: UK PERM REP IVOR RICHARD CALLED ON AMBASSADOR
YOUNG AUGUST 18 FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE NEXT STEPS IN
THE UK/US INITIATIVE ON RHODESIA. THE AMBASSADORS AGREED
THAT THE UNEQUIVOCAL PUBLIC SUPPORT OF THE FRONTLINE PRESIDENTS,
PERHAPS IN SOME FORM OF CO-RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SETTLE-
MENT PACKAGE, WAS ESSENTIAL TO ENSURE THE RIVAL ZIMBABWE
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NATIONALIST FACTIONS' AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S ENDORSEMENT
OF THE UK/US PACKAGE. END SUMMARY.

2. AMBASSADOR YOUNG REMARKED ON THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCY
OF SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTER BOTHA'S PUBLIC ANDPRIVATE
STATEMENTSON RHODESIA. HIS TOUGH AND SOMEWHAT PESSIMISTIC
LINE IN THE PRESS SEEMED CONTRAST WITH BOTHA'S DIPLOMATIC

EFFORTS IN SALISBURY. SOUTH AFRICA'S TRUE INTENTIONS IN RHODESIA WERE NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR. THE U.S. WAS OFFERING SOUTH AFRICA THE CHOICE OF THE CARROT OR THE STICK IN MAKING UP ITS MIND. IF SOUTH AFRICA COOPERATED IN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE RAPID AND PEACEFUL INDEPENDENCE IN RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA, IT COULD LOOK FORWARD TO A CONTINUING HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. IF IT OBSTRUCTED THESE EFFORTS, SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION AGAINST THE SMITH REGIME IN RHODESIA MIGHT BE EXTENDED TO SOUTH AFRICA. SECRETARY OF STATE VANCE, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD ALREADY OBTAINED THE AGREEMENT OF THE SHAH OF IRAN TO STOP OIL SHIPMENTS TO SOUTH AFRICA IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES. SIMILARLY, AMBASSADOR BOWDLER WAS SCHEDULED TO MAKE A DEMARCHE IN PRETORIA, TELLING THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT THAT THE BEST WAY TO ENSURE A BREAK WITH THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE TO EXPLODE A NUCLEAR DEVICE.

3. DISCUSSING THE INTENTIONS OF THE RHODESIAN REGIME, THE AMBASSADORS AGREED THAT SMITH COULD NOT BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED. DESPITE PREVIOUS PRIVATE ASSURANCES TO THE BRITISH THAT HE WAS ANXIOUS TO LAY DOWN HIS OFFICIAL BURDEN AND COULD ACCEPT THE TERMS OFFERED AT THE TIME, SMITH HAD ALWAYS BALKED AT THE LAST MOMENT. YOUNG SAID AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN SMITH'S SLIPPERINESS HAD UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN THE FAILURE OF THE ZIMBABWE NATIONALISTS TO UNITE. THAT WAS WHY IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT THE FRONTLINE PRESIDENTS LEND THEIR WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT TO THE INITIATIVE AND APPLY CONFIDENTIAL

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PRESSURE ON THE RIVAL ZIMBABWE FACTIONS TO UNITE IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

4. THE FRONTLINE PRESIDENTS WERE ALSO ESSENTIAL IN ENSURING THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA DID NOT ACT AS SPOILERS IN RHODESIA. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE MIGHT NOT SUPPORT BUT THEY ALMOST CERTAINLY WOULD NOT ACTIVELY OPPOSE A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON RHODESIA THAT HAD SOLID AFRICAN BACKING.

5. THE AMBASSADORS AGREED THAT THE FRONTLINE PRESIDENTS WANTED A RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT. YOUNG SAID THAT ALL OF THE FRONTLINE PRESIDENTS FACED VERY TROUBLESOME DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATIONS AND WERE AWARE THAT SOME OF THEM MIGHT NOT SURVIVE THE TURMOIL ATTENDANT UPON PROTRACTED VIOLENCE IN RHODESIA. THE FRONTLINE PRESIDENTS SHARED THE WESTERN POWERS' INTEREST IN A RAPID AND PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. THIS WAS THE BACKGROUND TO TANZANIAN PRESIDENT NYERERE'S RECENT ASSURANCES TO PRESIDENT CARTER THAT HE SUPPORTED THE UK/US INITIATIVE. THE UK/US MUST WORK TO TRANSLATE THAT SUPPORT INTO AN ACTIVE AND OPEN PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND THE FRONTLINE PRESIDENTS TO PUT OVER THE UK/US

INITIATIVE.

6. THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF A POSSIBLE SETTLEMENT SCENARIO WERE PRESENT IN RHODESIA, ACCORDING TO AMBASSADOR YOUNG. THE DISBANDING OF THE RHODESIAN ARMY NEED NOT PRESENT INSUPERABLE PROBLEMS. STRIPPED OF THE CELOUS SCOUTS AND THE MERCENARIES, IT WAS TOO SMALL A FORCE TO DOMINATE ANY NEW SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. MOREOVER, RHODESIAN GENERAL WALL APPEARED TO BE A REALISTIC AND COOPERATIVE ELEMENT. NYERERE HAD TOLD PRESIDENT CARTER THAT A FORCE OF ABOUT 5,000 ZIMBABWE NATIONALIST TROOPS IN TANZANIA HAD BEEN CAREFULLY INSULATED FROM THE POLITICAL RIVALRIES OF THE DIFFERENT ZIMBABWE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, AND, ONCE INTRODUCED INTO RHODESIA, WOULD LOYALLY SUPPORT A TRANSITIONAL
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ADMINISTRATION AND ANY FREELY ELECTED ZIMBABWE GOVERNMENT. A UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE MIGHT HAVE TO INTERVENE TO BREAK UP SOME FACTION FIGHTS, ESPECIALLY DURING THE ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN, BUT THERE WAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT IT COULD NOT HANDLE THE JOB. EVEN NOW, WHEN THERE IS AN ARMED STRUGGLE GOING ON, THE LEVEL OF VIOLENCE IN RHODESIA WAS COMPARATIVELY NOT VERY HIGH. PERSUADING THE LEADERS OF THE PATRIOTIC FRONT TO PUT DOWN THEIR ARMS MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED BY CONVINCING THEM THAT THEIR BEST CHANGE OF BEATING BISHOP MUZOREWA AT THE POLLS WAS TO TURN THEIR TROOPS INTO POLITICAL CADRES. INDEED, THE LEADERS OF THE FRONT ALREADY RECOGNIZED THE VALUE OF INDOCTRINATION, AND FRONT GUERRILLAS WERE DOING AS MUCH POLITICAL EDUCATION IN THE VILLAGES AS FIGHTING THE RHODESIAN ARMY.

7. THE AMBASSADORS CONCLUDED WITH THE AGREEMENT THAT THE TWO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD THINK SYSTEMATICALLY ABOUT WAYS OF OBTAINING THE FRONTLINE PRESIDENTS ACTIVE CO-OPERATION IN SUCH A SCENARIO, BEGINNING WITH SOME FORTH-RIGHT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE UK/US INITIATIVE, PERHAPS IN THE FORM OF AN OAU COMMUNIQUE OR CO-SPONSORSHIP OF A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION. AS A STARTER, UKUN AND USUN WILL CONSULT ON THIS POINT IN THE DAYS AHEAD.
YOUNG
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